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ABSTRACT

Federalism, Reapportionment and Innovation:
The Case of Agricultural Research and Extension
Susan Rose-Ackerman and Robert Evenson

This paper seeks to identify the economic and political factors
that produce state financial support for agricultural research and
extension.

We hypothesize that the state demand for research and

extension services is influenced not only by an interest in generating
social benefits but also by the size and political effectiveness of
farm interests and by the federal structure of government.

Although

basic measures of farm income and population are a key determinant of
spending patterns, measures of intergovernmental influence are also
empirically important.

Federal grants have "price" effects which

stimulate spending; the reapportionment of state legislatures mandated
by the U.S. Supreme Court had a negative effect, while the ability of
farmers to elect other farmers to the legislature raises state support

for research and extension.

In general, we conclude that given

current trends in political and economic conditions, the downward
trend in the relative importance of agricultural Rand D spending
appears likely to continue in spite of the high marginal rate of
return to such research.
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I.

Introduction
Empirical studies of the rate of return to publicly supported

..

agricultural research and extension show consistently high rates,
generally above 20% per year. 1

These results prompt an economist to

ask why the investment is not higher.

State and federal governments

do not appear to be maximizing the sum of producers' and consumers'
surplus.

We hypothesize, instead, that the demand for research and

extension services is influenced not only by an interest in generating
social benefits but also by the size and political effectiveness·o f
2
farm interests and by the federal structure of government ••

While

the supply of research and extension services may depend on the prices
of human and other resources and on the stock of potentially worth
while ideas, it is also determined by the availability of federal
grants and of spill-in technology.

In addition state spending may be

affected by laws and court decisions at the national level which
preempt state choices and affect ·the balance of political influence
within a state.

The major example here is the reapportionment of

state legislatures mandated by the Supreme Court in 1962.

This

judicial decision is widely believed to have reduced the relative
influence of farm and rural interests.

Our research is an advance

over work which looks separately at any one of these influences.

For

example, research on reapportionmen t has seldom directly studied
programs of interest to farmers and has not assessed the impact of
federal grants (see Saffell, 1982, 204-210). Conversely, research on
federal grants has not been concerned with the impact of reapportion
ment on state spending decisions (see e.g., Gramlich, 1977).
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Section II of the paper lays out the basic conceptual framework
and discusses our data base.
£indings.

Section III presents the research

We show that the overall importance of farming to a state

measured both in terms of income and population partially determines
spending patterns.

However, political structure and federal grants

also influence budgetary decisions.

We find that the reapportionment

in the 1960s, which reduced rural "over-representation," had a nega
tive effect on state support for research and extension spending.

We

also find that Federal grants play an independent role in affecting
state spending.

Although federal grants have no real marginal price

effect in most states, budget setters act as if grants reduce the
marginal cost of services.

In addition, if farmers are able to elect

other farmers to the legislature,this is associated with higher levels
of state support for agricultural research and extension.

Finally,

"spill-ins" of research results from other states appear to have a
negative effect on livestock research but are unimportant for crop
research.

II.

The Basic Framework
A.

The Interests of Farmers and Consumers

Most agricultural technology lowers costs and shifts supply
curves rightward.

With easy entry and few specialized factors, prices

tend to fall with average costs (Hayami and Ruttan, 1975; Evenson,
1982: Binswanger and Ruttan, 1978).

This suggests that, so long as

promising research projects are available, consumers should be the
major interest group supporting research and extension and implies
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that they would lobby for federal rather than state support.

It

appears, however, that consumer groups are relatively weak supporters
of research and extension at both the state and federal level.

3

In contrast, farm producer groups actively lobby state govern
ments for research and extension funds.

This behavior ceases to be

anomalous once one recognizes that most agricultural technology
produced by public sector experiment stations can only be used under
certain geoclimatic conditions.

Many crops which are close substi

tutes for consumers are grown under very different supply conditions.
Research which improves the productivity of Hard Red Spring wheat
grown in Minnesota, for example, may be of little or no use to Hard
Red Winter wheat farmers in Oklahoma.

Farm groups in a particular

state with localized growing conditions may thus earn "rent" by
supporting research and extension.

This will be the case if a state's

farmers provide only a small share of total market output and if their
growing conditions are very idiosyncratic.

Of course, the rent will

be eroded by the research and extension support programs of other
states, but the erosion is independent of the state's own invest-

ment.

4

The location specificity of agricultural technology is, however,
not neatly associated with state political boundaries.

Most new

technology produced by a particular state will "spill-in" to other
states with similar soil and climate conditions.

Thus "free-riding"

is possible for producer groups in states which receive technology
from outside (cf. Ruttan, 1982a).

It is not obvious, however, that

spill-ins will reduce the demand for state supported research.
Although direct transfers are possible in some cases, in other sit-
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uhions the borrowed research is not useful unless it has been incor
porated into the state's own research program and adapted to local
conditions.

To capture these effects for each state we have measures

of the investment in

research by states in similar geoclimatic region

based on work done by Evenson (1978).

We calculated separate spill-in

measures for crops (SPCROP) and livestock (SPLVSTK).

(See Appendix 1

for detailed definitions.)
In short, the multiplicity of state governments combined with
variable geoclimatic conditions helps to explain farmers' support for
research and extension.

While some borrowing is possible and may work

to reduce support, we hypothesize that it will not outweigh farmers'
other interests in higher state research budgets.

This is especially

likely to be so because farmers do not directly bear much of the cost
of financing the state experiment stations and the extension service.
B.

Empirical Specification

1.

Dependent Variables
We do not believe that it is possible to develop a plausible

model of state politics in which nthe government;; maximizes a utility
function subject to constraints or makes majoritarian choices reflect
ing the preferences of the median voter.

The political system is

simply too complex to be captured in this way.

We do, however,

believe that a range of exogenous political economic variables will
have a marginal impact on the share of a state's budget spent on
agricultural research and extension.
specify reduced form relationships

5

We proceed, therefore, to

between measures of state spend

ing, treated here as endogenously determined by states, and several
economic and political variables that affect supply and demand.

In
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tJ-is section the motivation for including each variable is explained.
They are defined precisely in Appendix 1 which also reports their
means and standard deviations.
We examine research and extension spending separately.

Budgetary

choices may differ for these two related programs because the politi
cal support for each is somewhat different and because separate
federal subsidies cover each program.

Research projects, involving

the search for new crop varieties and production techniques, may take
several years to produce useful results.

Therefore, research may be

most strongly supported by relatively large

farmers with a consider

able capital investment and a long-term perspective.

Such farmers may

have less demand for public extension service if they are highly
skilled managers and large purchasers of private extension services.
In contrast, the public extension services which disseminate research
results to farmers may be of relatively greater benefit to smaller,
poorer farmers.

Therefore, we expect that farm income will be rela

tively strongly associated with research while farm population will be
more strongly associated with extension.

We use state data for the agricultural census years 1959, 1964,
1969, 1974 and 1978 and estimate two related specifications for
research spending and for extension spending.

The first takes total

state appropriations as a share of the budget as the dependent vari
able (STRS/SB and STEXT/SB for research and extension respectively).
This specification assumes that states choose a level of overall
appropriations on the basis of state economic and political charac
teristics and federal grants.

The second attempts to explain excess

state spending over the amount required to match federal grants

-8-

(XSTRS/SB and XSTEXT/SB for research and extension).

This second

formulation assumes that state political choices focus on spending not
required for matching purposes.
To see how the two types of de
pendent variables are related, suppose that an increase in federal
grants of one dollar induces an increase of 75 cents in state appro
priations.

Suppose that the matching rate is 50% so that every dollar

of federal money must be matched by a dollar of state money.

Then if

total state appropriations increase by 75 cents, excess spending, not
required to satisfy matching requirements, falls by 25 cents.

In

making our estimates we impose this restriction on the federal grant
coefficients.
We make a moderately strong assumption about the link between
spending on research and extension and the total state budget.

The

dependent variables are defined as shares of the total state budget.
Since total state spending is closely related to state income, we
include total personal income of the state (TPY) as an independent
variable.

We hypothesize that the share of the budget expended on

agricultural research and extension is related to a set of economic
and political variables and to the total personal income of the state.
However, the overall budget is assumed to be more income elastic than
appropriations for agricultural Rand D.

Thus an increase in state

income should reduce the budget share of agricultural research and
extension •.
2.

Farm Income and Population Variables
We expect that states with higher farm income and population

shares (NFY/TPY and FPOP/TPOP respectively) will spend a higher
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proportion of their budgets for both research and extension.

The

interpretation of a significant positive coefficiant is difficult,
however.

Ceteris paribus the benefits to a state of its agricultural

research and extension activity will be larger if farm income and
population are high.

Alternatively, if farmers are an important

source of a state's income and a substantial fraction of the
population, we might expect them to be an effective political force
capable of obtaining high levels of public research and extension
spending.

The relative size of the farm population is a proxy for

their voting strength.

Farm income, through campaign contributions

and other favors, may also translate into political influence.
3.

Measures of Farmers' Political Influence

Although we have not been able to examine the explicit mechanisms by
which farm income and population affect research and extension spend
ing, we have tried to capture farmers' political influence more
carefully than previous work.

We were aided in this effort by the

availability of data stretching back to 1958 and by an important
structural change in state political systems that occurred during the

1960s.

In 1962 the U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,

226 (1962), decided that both houses of a state's legislature must be
apportioned so that each district contained approximately the same
number of voters.

Before this decision went into effect as few as 12%

of the voters in some states could elect 50% of the members of one
house of the State legislature.

6

When this proportion is low, rural

voters are generally overrepresented in the legislature.

By the end

of the sixties about 50% of the population was needed to elect 50% of
the legislature in all states.

7

Thus the Supreme Court decision
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makes it possible to distinguish between political power determined by
numbers and wealth irrespective of the particular structure of the
political system and influence that depends upon favorable institu
tional arrangements.
reapportionment.

We have two ways to capture the impact of

First of all we have a measure of the share of the

population needed to control the state legislature (PCNTC).

Second,

since the reapportionment decision occurred in the middle of our data
set, we can see whether rural overrepresentation aided farm interests
in the earlier period.

Thus, we have defined a dummy variable (APP)

which equals one if a data point is from the post-apportionment period
and zero otherwise.

We interact this dummy with both the farm income

and population variables and expect that for the post-apportionment
period population will have more influence and income less.
For the most recent years we have another explicitly political
variable:

the proportion of legislators who list farming as their

occupation (PCFRMR).

The proportion ranged from Oto 47% in 1975 with

a mean of 10.4% (Insurance Information Institute, 1976). Of course, a
simple vote maximizing model of politicians; behavior implies that a
person's occupation ought to be irrelevant to the policies he or she
espouses.

Legislators simply vote in the way that will maximize their

chance of reelection.

However, if one assumes that voters do not take

much time to find out about candidates' positions, then occupation may
be important.

Voters might suppose that if a candidate is labeled a

"farmer", he will look out for farmers' interests better than a lawyer
or an insurance agent.

Occupational classification is a kind of

signal to voters indicating the candidate's policy positions.

If this

view is plausible, the proportion of legislators who are farmers is a
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measure of farmers' ability to elect people to state office who are
willing to work for agricultural interests.

Since we would expect

PCFRMR to depend on the proportion of farm income and farm population
in a state, we regressed PCFRMR on NFT/TPY and FPOP/TPOP for the 1969-74-78
data sets and entered the residual in the regressions
(RESFMRS). 8
We also have one measure of farmers' organizing ability:

member

ship in marketing coops divided by the number of commercial farms
(MCOOP).

Farmers, already organized to market their products, might
This variable may

use these cooperatives to lobby public officials.
not, however, be a purely political measure.

A strong cooperative

movement in a state may also facilitate the introduction of new
technology and thus increase the benefits of research.
Finally, some work by political scientists suggests that the
civil war left the southern states with a different political struc
Thus some empirical

ture and culture than the rest of the country.

work on state politics includes a dummy variable for the southern
states to take account of these differences.

This,

of course, amounts to an admission of ignorance.

If one understood

why the south is special, one could capture these distinctive charac
teristics explicitly.

To find out if we too have omitted important

southern regional characteristics we also include a southern dummy
variable (SOUTH).

Product mix might, however, be more important than

region. Perhaps crop farmers are on balance a more effective political
force than livestock farmers.

Thus we include a variable measuring

the share of agricultural output accounted for by crops (CSHARE).
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4.

Intergovernmental Grants
Subtle interstate differences in political structure and marginal

benefits may, however, be swamped by the overwhelming effect of
Federal grant programs.

Thus we include measures of Federal grants as

a share of the total state budget (FEDRS/SB and FEDEXT/SB for research
and extension respectively).
Federal funds are important, accounting for between one quarter
and one third of total research spending and about 40% of extension
spending.

Given a matching rate of about 50%,

9 this implies that

only about one-third to one-half of all research dollars and about 20%
of extension dollars are freely allocated by states over and above the
required matching share.

10

Since the grants are closed-ended and

since most states spend more than their matching share, a marginal
increase in federal dollars would have an income effect but no price
effect if governments responded as if they were rational individual
consumers.

There is little reason to suppose, however, that models of

individual behavior can be applied uncritically to studies of government actions.

In fact, evidence from ether public

support such analogies.

prngram~ nne~ nn~

Most of these studies show that governments

respond as if lump sum grants reduced the per unit price of the public
service.

11

This so-called "flypaper" effect (i.e., "money sticks

where it hits") has been explained in terms of a money illusion
·
· i ng po 1·i t i cians.
d e 1 i.berate 1 y perpetuate dby budget max i miz

12

Suppose that the cost of one unit of public service is $1 and that the
federal government gives the state government a lump sum grant of R.
If total state spending on this service is B, then proponents of this
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-theory hypothesize that voters believe that the tax cost of an extra
unit is B;R which is less than the actual cost of $1.

The larger

is R, the smaller is this perceived tax cost, and the more of the
service people want. Unless the income elasticity of demand for the
service is very high, a grant to the government will generate more
spending on the service than an equivalent grant given directly to the
population.
5.

Estimation Procedures
We estimate two alternative four equation systems utilizing the

Zellner (1962) seemingly unrelated procedure.

Actually our results

are very close to OLS estimates since the only independent variables
which differ in the equations are the federal funds variables
(FEDRS/SB in the research equations and FEDEXT/SB in the extension
equations.)

We also imposed a restriction across the two research

equations (STRS/SB and XSTRS/SB) and the two extension equations
(STEXT/SB and XSTEXT/SB) which forced the federal funds coefficients
to be consistent in both equations.

13

We report two versions of the statistical model to illustrate two
alternative approaches to measuring a reapportionment effect (Table
1).

The first version relies on the PCNTC (percent necessary to

control) variable to measure a reapportionment effect.

The second

version interacts the post-apportionment dummy variable (APP) with
farm income (NFY/TPY), farm population (FPOP/TPOP) and federal grants
(FEDRS/SB, FEDEXT/SB) to estimate shifts in the effects of these
variables which can be arguably attributed to reapportionment.

Since

RESFMRS is only available for recent years, we also estimated equa
tions using the post-apportionment period taken by itself
(Table 2).

-14-

III. Results
Our results (Tables 1

and 2) help to distinguish between the

influence of the federal structure of government, the political
organization of farmers, and basic measures of their numbers and
income.

Clearly, much of the interstate variation in states' spending

can be explained with no help from measures of government structure or
$he\..'<""'{..

federal grants.A high farm in~omev(NFY/TPY) is linked to high budget
shares for research while the farm population share (FPOP/TPOP) is a
significant determinant of extension spending.

In contrast, income is

a much less important determinant of extension spending, and popu
lation has no significant impact on research spending. 14

These

results are consistent with the idea that agricultural research is of
more direct benefit to farmers in proportion to their income while
extension benefits are proportional to the size of the farm popu
lation.

Therefore, they suggest that interstate differences in

spending are tied to interstate differences in benefits.
However, the results also imply that it is not enough simply to
know how important farming is in a state.

The regressions indicate

that political structure affects state choices.
legislative apportionment.

First, consider

The results in equations (2), (4), (6),

(8) in Table 1 support our predictions about the impact of reappor
tionment especially for research.

Although farm population fell over

this period as a share of the total population, on the margin its
impact increased.

For extension, the main impact is on "excess" state

spending where the coefficient on the farm income share falls to 20%

-15-

of its preapportionment value and the coefficient on the farm popu
lation share more than doubles.

..

shift in the elasticities.

(There was, of course, also a large

See Table 3.)

Another way of looking at the impact of state legislative appor
tionment is through PCNTC which measures the percent of the population
needed to elect 50% of the legislature.
.32 with a range of .12 to .48.

ln 1964 the mean of PCNTC was

By 1969, after reapportionment, the

mean was .48 with a range of .45 to .52.

This variable helps explain

interstate differences in research appropriations although the signif
icance level is not very high.

The higher the level of rural over

representation in state legislatures (the lower is PCNTC), the higher
the budget share.

Apparently, reapportionment has reduced farmers'

power to affect the level of research spending.
Second, we examine two variables which measure the ability of
farmers to organize to pursue their interests.

One, membership in

marketing cooperatives (MCOOP), is insignificant.

This casts doubt on

anecdotal testimony which emphasizes the power of the cooperative
movement as well as on the results of Guttman (1978) and Huffman and
Miranowski (1981).

In contrast, we have employed a new variable which

does have a high level of explanatory power for both research and
extension.

For recent years, we know whether farmers were particular

ly successful in electing other farmers to the legislature (RESFMRS).
An increase in this variable implies added support for farm programs
(Table 2).

15

Third, the results for the full data set suggest that states do
try to free ride off the research of others especially for livestock
research (SPLVSTK).

This effect applies to extension spending as
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well.

16

Apparently, the possibility of borrowing others' livestock

research does not require states to spend much to adapt this research
to local conditions.

Even without direct evidence on productivity,

this free riding suggests that the overall level of spending will be
inefficiently low.
Finally, federal grants appear to have an important "price"
effect on state appropriations.

Almost all states spend more than

their required matching share.

Therefore, on the margin the state

government should treat the grant like a lump sum grant.

Analytically

the subsidy is no different from an untied cash grant from the Federal
government.

Since agricultural research and extension spending each

average about one quarter of one percent of a state's budget, it seems
plausible to assume that a $1 ·increase in a state's income would
produce only a very small increase in total spending on these programs
even if the income elasticity of demand for the programs were large.
Thus if the marginal increase in grants were treated in this way,
state appropriations on agricultural research and extension (STRS,
STEXT) would fall by almost one dollar.

If the coefficient on federal

grants in the state appropriations equation were almost minus one
dollar, "excess" spending would fall by two dollars (one dollar to
match the federal grant and one dollar to be spent elsewhere).

The

results do not support this view of the marginal effect of grants.
Although on the margin they are "really" untied lump sum grants,
governments

appear to treat these funds as if they lowered the

marginal cost of agricultural research and extension.

It is not clear

why this happens, but it is consistent with other research showing
that Federal money "sticks where it hits."

In fact, the result is

-17-

stronger than this.

Not only does the Federal money stay in agricul

tural research and extension but it also seems to stimulate state
spending.

The closed-ended matching grants appear to have price

effects even when the matching share is exceeded.

Instead of being

close to minus one, the coefficients on federal funds are positive.
They are .15 for research and .75 for extension (thus excess research
spending falls by 85 cents and excess extension spending falls by 25
cents).

17

In recent years the price effects are even stronger

especially for research.

(See row (7) in Table 1 which reports the

coefficient on (APP)*(FEDRS/SB)).

18

Table 3 summarizes our estimates in the form of elasticities
computed at data means.

These elasticities not only summarize our

estimates but also suggest implications for the future growth in
spending.

The effects of the variables PCNTC (reapportionment),

SPLVSTK (spill-in), and CSHARE (crop share in output) are unlikely to
change very much in the next decade or so.

Reapportionment, of

course, had the additional effect of shifting the basic support base
for both research and extension away from farm income

population.

~nrl ~nu~rrl f~rm

However, even if farm population were to grow at the same

rate as farm income in the future, both state research and state
extension spending would fall as a proportion of state budgets.

The

sum of the post-apportionment elasticities is consistently less than
one.

-~--------------------------------~---~-------------------~--------------------~~---~--~-----~-~----------------

Table 1.

(l)TPY
(2)NFY/TPY

I

co

.

r-1

-

(4) FPOP/TPOP

.151
(.89)

-

(6)FEDRS/SB!
FEDEXT/SB
(7) (6)*APP

.154
(1.58)

(8) PCNTC

-.179
(1.56)
.Oll
( 1.19)
-.0005
( 1. 23)
-.OOll
(3.38)
.084
(2. 15)
-.004
(. 25)

(9) MCOOP
(10) SPCROP
(ll) SPLVSTK
(12) CSHARE
(13) SOUTH

~·

(1)
.236
(3.90)
-.0020
(3.65)
1.465
(6.61)

(3) (2)* APP

(5) (4)*APP

f

Full Data Set:.

De;eendent Variables
XSTRS/SB
STRS/SB

Inde;eendent
Variables
Intercept

Regression Estimates:

-

(2)
.172
(2.70)
-.0013
(2.47)
1.976
(5.06)
-.996
(2.18)
-.150
(. 66)
.518
(1.61)
.154
(1.26)
.323
(2.15)
-.146
(1.25)
.013
(1.39)
-.0005
(1.07)
-.0010
(3.01)
.101
(2.57)

-.006
( .40)

(3)
.311
(5 .12)
-.0028
(5.29)
1.784
(8.04)

-

.132
(.79)

-

-.846
(8.70)

-

-.223
(1.95)
.0010
(.11)
-.0006
(1.37)
-.0013
(4.02)
,039
(1.00)
-.008
(.52)

(4)
.240
(3.76)
-.0022
(4.07)
2.126
(5.43)
-.815
(1. 78)
-.124
(. 54)
.519
(1.61)
-.846
(6. 87)
.323
(2.15)
-.186
(1.58)
.0019
(.20)
-.0005
(1.21)
-.0012
(3.68)
.062
(1.57)
-.Oll
(.74)

XSTEXT/SB

STEXT/SB
(5)
.168
(3.18)
-.0011
(2.46)
-.017
( .09)

-

.468
(3.01)

-

.752
(14.09)

-

-.083
(.79)
-.003
( .39)
-.0005
(1.15)
-.0007
(2.30)
.005
(.13)
-.035
(2.35)

(6)
.160
(2. 88)
-.0010
(2 .17)
•719
(2.08)
-1.01.
(2.51)
.198
(. 9~,)
.274
(.90)
•737
(11.73)
.108
(1.U')
-.075
(. 71)
-.0013
( .16)
-.0005
(1.20)
-.0006
(2.20)
-.002
( .05)
-.038
(2.50)

(7)

.216
(4.10)
-.0019
(4.32)
.514
(2.61)

-

.629
(4. 06)

-

-.248
(4.65)

-

-.80
(. 77)
-.003
( .39)
-.0003
(.39)
-.0008
(2.69)
-.048
(1.41)
.020
(1. 32)

(8)
.172
(3.12)
-.0002
(3.89)
.968
(2.82)
-.848
(2.12)
.361
(1. 72)
.565
( 1. 86)
-.263
(4.19)
.108
(1.17)
-.037
(.35)
-.006
(. 74)
-.0002
(.62)
-.0008
(2.78)
-.037
(1.06)
.014
(.90)

(14) D59

.

(15) D64
(16) D69
(17) D74
2
Weighted R2
for System

-.062
- (2.41)
-.026
(1. 00)
.022
(1. 16)
-.021
(. 96)
.7841

-.016
( .48)
.Oll

(.33)
.006
(. 31)
-.028
(1.19)
.7886

-.069
(2.72)
-.022
( .84)
.056
(2.87)
.027
{1.19)
.7841

-.15
( .43)
.024
(.74)
.040
(1.98)
.021
(.89)
.7886

-.017
(. 74)
-.004
( .17)
.012
(.70)
-.094
(4.56)
.7841

-.om

(. 62)
-.008
{. 28)
.010
{.60)
-.09'9
(4.53)

.78:86

-.051
(2.20)
-.018
{.80)
.017
{. 99)
-.002
( .08)
.7841.

-.010
(.34)
.016
( .55)
.018
(1.07)
.0003
(.02)
.7882

t - statistics in parentheses
1FEDRS/SB in (1), (2), (3), (4); FEDEXT/SB in (5), (6), (7), (8).
2Equations (1), (3), (5), (7) run as a system, and equations (2), (4), (6), (8) run as a
system,

I

~
I

~
~

,t
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Table 2 Regression Estimates: 1969, 1974, 1978
IndeEendent

Dependent Variables

Variables

STRS/SB

Intercept
(l)TPY

XSTRS/SB

STEXT/SB

XSTEXT/SB

-.102

-.059

.021

.074

(3.39)

( 1. 97)

(.78)

(2.75)

-.000003

(2) NFY/TPY
(3) FPOP/TPOP
(4)"FEDRS/SB
FEDEXT/SB
(5) RESFMRS
(6) MCOOP
(7) SPCROP

(8) SPLVSTK
(9) CSHARE
(10) SOUTH
(11) D69

(12) D74

Weighted R2
for System

1

-.0007

.0001

-.0006

( .01)

(1.52)

(.30)

(1.41)

• 778

1.122

-.322

.129

(3.56)

(5. 22)

(1.52)

(.63)

.391

.444

.267

.710

(1.84)

(2.12)

(3.37)

.792

-.208

(1.24)
. 1.044

(7 .82)

(2.05)

(14.08)

( .60)

1.038

1.063

• 728

.549

(6.94)

(7 .23)

(4.95)

(3.83)

.012

-.002

(1.23)

(.17)

(.68)

( .17)

-.00002

-.0001

-.00001

-.0001

(.06)

( .24)

( .02)

( .25)

.0002
(. 76)

-.00007
(.25)

.0002

.00003

.0063

.044

-.0015

(.69)

(.10)

.317

.279

.044

-.015

(6.81)

(6.09)

(. 97)

(.35)

.044

.047

-.025

.030

(2.61)

(2.84)

(1.42)

(1.74)

.035

.070

.023

.025

(2.06)

(4.19)

(1.48)

(1.63)

.044

.094

-.091

-.0039

(2.02)

(4.42)

(4.23)

(.18)

.5771

.5771

.5771

1
FEDRS/SB in research regressions; FEDEXT/SB in extension
regressions.
t - statistics in parentheses

.5771
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Table 3
Elasticities of Estimates in able 1
Computed at Data Means

1

STRS/SB
(1)

TPY
NFY/TPY

-.09

(2)

-.06

.30

XSTRS/SB
(3)

(4)

-.21

-.17

STEXT/SB

XSTEXT/SB

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

-.05

-.04

-.15

-.16

.61

.17

PREAPP 2

.41

• 72

.14

.33

P0STAPP

.20

.41

-.09

.04

FP0P/TP0P

.26

.38

PREAPP

.22

P0STAPP
FEDRS/SB

.16
.08

.25

-.79

PREAPP

.09

-.79

P0STAPP

.26

-.44

FEDEXT/SB
.PCNTC
SPLVSTK
CSHARE

.47

-.09

-.08

.12

.15

-.65

-.54

-.17

-.16

.59

.58

-.35

-.37

-.05

-.04

-.11

-.11

.15

-=

12

1
Elasticities are only presented for variables whose parameters
were significant.at a 10% level or better.
2
PREAPP = pre-apportionm ent; P0STAPP = post-apportionm ent.
The post-apportionm ent estimates use the means for the last
three data sets.
3

t = 1.25, slightly below 10% significance level.
Table A2. Logarithmic Form Regressions - Full Data Set
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IV.

Implications for the Future
The absolute level of real spending, state plus federal, for

agricultural research and extension has been roughly constant for the
past ten to fifteen years and spending relative to the value of
agricultural product has declined by roughly
. d • 19
perio

30 percent over this

Our results suggest that part of this relative decline is

due to the fall in the share of farm income and farm population in
state totals.

Since this downward trend is likely to continue, Rand

D spending cannot be expected to grow in real terms.

Reapportionment

may-have caused a one time decline in states with high farm income
shares.

The countervailing increase in the importance of farm popu

lation in state spending decisions gives little grounds for optimism,
however, since the farm population continues to fall as a share of the
total.

Thus unless federal funding for agricultural research and

extension or total state budgets increase rapidly, the proportion of
agricultural product invested in public sector research and extension
will continue the decline which began about fifteen years ago.
Neither possibility appears likely in the present political climate.

Private sector research and extension has, however, increased over the
period of our scudy.

Since there are no adequate measures of these

investments, however, we have been unable to incorporate them into our
analysis.

It is not obvious, however, that private agricultural

suppliers will adequately make up for the relative decline in public
spending.

If the productivity measures are accurate,

20

agricultural

research and extension appears to be one area of government spending
where a study of the marginal benefits would show that an increase
rather than a decrease in public support was warranted.
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Appendix I
Variable Definitions
The dependent variables are defined as follows:
STRS/SB:

State appropriations for agricultural research in

thousands of dollars (STRS) divided by total state and local govern
ment spending from own sources in hundreds of thousands of dollars
(SB).

Thus STRS/SB is one hundred times the budget share.

We have

included local revenues in SB to correct for arbitrary differences
across states in the division of functions between levels of govern
ment.

In fact, the form of the revenue variable is likely to be

unimportant.
lated.

The alternatives we considered were all highly corre

State revenues from own sources in 1974, for example, has a

correlation coefficient of .991 with SB.

The source for SB is U.S.

Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances.

Sources for STRS are

USDA Funds for Research and USDA, Cooperative State Research Service,
Inventory of Agricultural Research.

These sources are not completely

compatible. Funds for Research was discontinued 1n 1975 and the CSRS
data is available beginning with the i970 data set.

In the results in

the text, Funds for Research was used through 1974.

Using CSRS data

for 1970 and 1974 made only a minor difference in the results.
XSTRS/SB:
SB.

STRS minus an estimate of matching funds divided by

Discussion with officials at the USDA and study of the laws

indicates that XSTRS can be approximated as:
XSTRS/SB

= (STRS - (Federal grants for research in thousands of
dollars - 90))/SB.

In other words, each state receives $90,000 and must match other grants
dollar for dollar.

See USDA Cooperative State Experiment Station Services

(1962, pp. 219ff), and the laws cited in footnote 9.
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STEXT/SB:

State appropriations for agricultural extension in thou

sands of dollars divided by SB.

The numerator (STEXT) is calculated by

subtracting federal grants from total state spending on extension.

The

source for total state spending is unpublished data from the USDA, Federal
Extension Service.
XSTEXT/SB: STEXT minus an estimate of matching funds divided by SB.
USDA officials estimate that the share of grants requiring matching was 55%
in 1978, 56% in 1974, and 74% in earlier years.

(Conversation with Daniel

Domingo, USDA Extension Service).
Therefore, XSTEXT/SB = (STEXT - A*federal grants for research in thousands
of $)/SB,
where A= .55 in 1977
A= .56 in 1974
A= .74 in 1958, 1964, and 1969.
The independent variables are defined as follows:
NFY/TPY:

Net Farm Income/Total Personal Income.

(Source:

U.S. Dept.

of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.)
FPOP/TPOP:

•

Farm Population/Total Population.

Sources:

U.S. Depart-

ment of Agriculture, Farm Population Estimates, 1910-1970, U.S.D.A.

ESCS-86, August, 1980, and U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Population Census.

Farm population is defined as "all persons living in

rural territory on places of 10 or more acres, if as much as $50 worth of
agricultural products were sold from the place in the reporting year.

It

also includes those living on places of under 10 acres, if as much as $250
worth of agricultural products were sold from the place in the reporting
year."

(P.6, U.S.D.A., ESCS-86).

A new definition based on sales is being

considered by the U.S.D.A., but is not reflected in the numbers used here.
For 1974, the data for 1969 were used since state by state estimates are
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not av"ailable after 1970.

For 1979 the U.S. Department of Agriculture

estimated the farm population in nine regions of the U.S.

Thus farm

population for the last data set was estimated by first calculating the
share of each state in the farm population of its regional division in
1970.

This share was then multiplied by estimated farm population in the

region in 1979 from U.S.D.A. publication ESCS-86, August, 1980.

This

procedure assumes that each state in a region lost farm population at the
same rate as the region as a whole.
CSHARE:

The dollar value of crop output divided by the dollar value

of all farm output (Source U.S.D.A., Census of Agriculture).
TPY:

Total Personal Income, in billions of constant dollars.

data are deflated by the GNP Deflator (1959=100).
with SB.

The

TPY is highly correlated

Regressing SB in 1974 on TPY and total population (TPOP) in

3
thousands (xl0 ) yields:
SB= -1431 + 195TPY - .24TPOP
(.63)

(4.98)

SPCR0P and SPLVSTK:

(.12)

Spill-in Research Stock.

Cumulated research

expenditures in billions of dollars (using information from Evenson 1978)
on crop and livestock research, respectively, in similar
regions in other states.

Sixteen regions were defined from data published

in the 1957 U.S.D.A. Yearbook of Agriculture.
divided into sub-regions.

geoclimatic

Studies by Evenson

Each region was further
&

Welch (1975) and Evenson

(1978) concluded that crop research borrowing is primarily confined to
similar subregions while livestock research borrowing is broader in scope
and takes place across regions.

FEDRS/SB:

Federal Spending for agricultural research in thousands of

dollars divided by SB.

Measured as 100 times the budget share. (Source:

U.S.D.A. CSRS, Inventory of Agricultural Research and unpublished data from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture).
FEDEXT/SB:

Federal spending on extension divided by SB.

100 times the budget share.

Measured as

(Source: unpublished data from the U.S.

Department of Agriculture. Federal Extension Service).
MCOOP:

The number of farmers who are members of marketing coopera

tives divided by the total number of commercial farms (i.e., farms selling
proaucts valued at over $2500 per year).

The cooperative variable is often

greater than one (mean 1.4) because many farmers are members of several
marketing cooperatives.

Service coops are omitted because they frequent-

ly include a heterogeneous collection of farmers with few common political
interests.

(Source:

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farmer Cooperative

Service, Statistics of Farmer Cooperatives, and U.S. Department of Com
merce, Statistical Abstract of the U.S.).
PCFRMR:
occupation.

The percentage of state legislators who list farming as their
The mean of PCYRMR is .ii5.

Institute (1976)).

(Source:

Insurance Information

The data are only available for 1976 and 1978.

For

1969 and 1974 we used the 1976 data since this variable appears to be
relatively stable from year to year for individual states.
PCNTC:

The share of the population needed to control the state

legislature (PCNTC).

Because this variable is available separately for

each house of the state legislature, we averaged together the two shares.
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Since a law must pass both houses and since the houses often differ widely
in the number of members, this seemed to be a better procedure than using
the percent needed to elect 50% of the total number of members.

Source:

Book of the States.
A second apportionment measure (SMCTY) is available for the early
years.

For 1950 and 1960 Paul David and Ralph Eisenberg calculated the

share of each state's legislature representing counties with less than
25,000 people.

If the people in these counties are heavily dependent upon

agriculture for income and employment, this number is an alternative
indicatio.n of "excess" agricultural political strength.
and Eisenberg, 1961).

(Source:

David

One would also expect this measure of farmers

political strength to be associated with NFTPY and FRTPOP.

A regression

for the years 1954, and 1958 and 1964 indicates that this is so.

(For 1964

and 1958 the 1960 values for SMCTY were used and for 1954 we used the 1950
data).

The result was
SMCTY = 121.37 + 1877.4 + 763.57 FRTPOP
(4.78)

(3.78)

(2.46)

Using the residuals of this regression in regressions involving only the
preapportionme nt years showed that this variable had little explanatory
power.
Post-apportionm ent variables:

APP= 1 if the data point is in the

post-apportionm ent period (1969, 1974, 1978) and= 0 otherwise.

This

variable is multiplied by several other independent variables as a means of
measuring reapportionmen t effects.
A dummy variable (SOUTH) that equals one if the state is a Southern
State.

We use the U.S. Government's definition of the south.

Thus SOUTH
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equals one for the states:

Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia,

North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee,
Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and Texas.
Dummy variables for each of the data sets except 1978.
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Table A-1
Means and Standard Deviations
Units

1969, 1974,
1978

All Data Sets
Means

Std.Dev.

Means

Std.Dev.

STRS/SB

share x 100

.239

.145

.232

.146

XSTRS/SB

share x 100

.144

.119

.150

.115

STEXT/SB

share x 100

.259

.148

.229

.130

XSTEXT/SB

share x 100

.144

.096

.143

.089

NFY1TPY

share

.049

.052

.047

.056

FPOP/TPOP

share

.087

.073

.073

.062

TPY

Billion $

11.16

13.59

13.31

15.28

SPCR0P

20.28

14.78

23.38

15.80

SPLVSTK

18.93

19.03

20.94

21.22

1.32

.78

MCOOP

Members/Farm

CSHARE

share

.347

.189

.338

.173

FEDRS/SB

share x 100

.135

.091

.127

.093

FEDEXT/SB

share x 100

.204

.146

.191

.141

PCNTC

share

.420

.090

.483

.017

RESFMRS*

share

* Range given in parentheses

1.34

.768

0(-.12to.20)

.05
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...
APPENDIX 2

Table A2 reports a logarithmic specification of the
version one estimates reported in Table I.

The only sub

stantive differences in these estimates are a) the federal
funds effect is lower, in fact negative for research and b)
the free-riding effect on livestock research is less signif
icant. We believe that the fact that a number of variables
are expressed in share form in the linear specification
argues against placing emphasis on the logarithmic form.
Logarithms of small shares are more sensitive to errors than
the shares themselves.

Accordingly we believe that the

basic linear specification discussed in the text is more
appropriate.
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Table A2.

Logarithm ic Functiona l Forms

Dependent Variables

-·

Independe nt
Variables
Intercept
(I)

(2)

(3)

(4)

LN(TPY

LN(NFY/TPY)

LN(FPOP/TPOP)

LN(FEDRS/SB)
LN(FEDEXT/SB) 1

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

LN(PCNTC)

LN(MCOOP)

LN(CSHARE)

SPCROP 2

SPLVSTK2

LN(STRS/SB) LN(XSTRS/SB) LN(STEXT/SB LN(XSTEXT/SB)
-4.717

-6.089

-4 .471

-5.401

-.345

-.691

-.161

-.488

(5.02)

(5.90)

(4.09)

(6.95)

.441

• 725

.104

.150

(8.35)

(6.71)

(2.50)

(1.55)

-.033

.019

.269

.795

( .45)

(.14)

(4.09)

(5.83)

.137

-1.093

-.245

-1.22

(2.11)

(6.64)

(1.88)

(8.57)

-.180

-.391

.034

.034

(1.23)

(1.31)

(.29)

(.14)

.049

.132

.002

.044

(1.07)

(1.42)

(.06)

( .53)

.091

.127

-.041

-.080

(1.71)

(1.16)

(.97)

( .87)

.00005

.0013

-.0007

( .03)

.32

(.42)

( .47)

-.0007

.0006

-.0016

-.0016

( .52)

( .21)

(1.44)

.0017

(.60)
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(10) South

D59

D64

D69

D74

.198

.218

.270

.681

(2.64)

(1.45)

(4.34)

(4.91)

-.232

-.490

-.068

-.556

(2.40)

(2.52)

(.90)

(3.14)

-.063

-.083

.050

-.062

(.63)

(. 41)

(. 63)

(.34)

.129

.448

.062

.173

(1.31)

(2.36)

(.95)

(1.14)

.270

-.230

(1.21)

(2.51)

-.08
(.74)

2

System R

.8047

.8047

.8047

t - statistics in parentheses.

1

FEDRS/SB in research regressions;

FEDEXT/SB in extension

regressions.

2

Not expressed in logs because of the existence of some zero
values in SPLVSTK.

.33
(1.66)

.8047
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FOOTNOTES

*
.

'

This research was partially funded by the U.S. Department of

Agriculture .

Ann Judd, Gary Moss, and Richard Whitten provided

able research assistance.

Wallace Huffman provided helpful

comments on an earlier draft.
1.

Evenson, Waggoner and Ruttan (1979), Ruttan (1980), Ruttan

(1982a).

This research has been recently criticized by Paseur

and Johnson (1982).
their criticisms.

Ruttan (1982b) convincingl y responds to
Although he himself believes that any of the

older studies were methodolog ically flawed, he argues that more
recent studies which also show high rates of return should be
accepted.
2.

See Rose-Ackerman (1980a) for a general discussion of the

problematic links between efficiency and democracy, and
Rose-Ackerm an (1981) for an analysis of the link between federal
structure and political choice.

Rose-Ackerm an (1980b)

criti

cizes the widely held view that a federal system will facilitate
innovation.
3.

Consumer groups have been active in support of research on

family economics, food technology, and related extension work at
both the state and federal levels.

They have stressed food

additives etc. but have not been strong advocates of research
designed to increase the productivit y of farming.
(1982).

See Evenson
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4.

Nelson (1982) argues that this attempt to gain at the

expense of competitors in other states distinguishes farming from home
building and helps explain the greater support for research by farmers
• I

than building contractors.

5.

Previous work indicates that a political-economic approach

to explaining agricultural Rand D spending is a useful one
although these studies have also been unable to separate com
pletely the benefits of research to farmers from their ability to
influence politics.

A study by Peterson (1966) showed that state

· support for agricultural research was related to state income and
population variables in the same way that total state government
spending is related to state income and population.

Guttman

(1978) argues that interest groups supply votes to politicians
according to (1) the politician's support for the group's inter
est; (2) the size of the group; (3) individual demands within the
group and (4) the level of organization of the group.

A politi

cian will demand votes from groups according to their marginal
product in an electoral function.

Guttman then finds empirical

support for the interest group hypothesis by showing that per
capita state support for agricultural research is related to the
size distribution of farmers, co-op memberships, firms producing
inputs, borrowable research and the proportion·of owner opera
tors.

Most relevant to our research is a recent paper by Huffman

and Miranowski (1981).

They also try to explain per capita state

spending on agricultural research as a function of the importance
of farming in the state, the state's budget, and measures of the
benefits of research to farmers and of their ability to organize
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for political action.

The most distinctive aspect of their study is

an attempt to measure supply side variables.

Their idea is a good

one, but the interpretation of their results is complicated by

·.

(

simultaneous equation problems.

Some of their measures of the

productivity of research spending are, in fact, also related to
the size of the research budget and so cannot be convincingly
used to "explain" its level.

6.

Book of the States.

This number implies that districts

containing 12% of the population could elect 50% of the legis. lators. In a majority rule system with two candidate races in
each district, half the population could elect a majority of the
legislature.

Thus even with perfect apportionment just over 25%

of the voting population of a state could elect a majority of a
state senate or house.

7.

Book of the States and National Municipal League (1970).

8.

The regression results were:
PCFRMRS = 0.623 + 43.41 NFT/TPY + 122.09 FPOP/TPOP

(.95)
9.

(3.16)

(9.83)

2
R = .79

See P.L. 89-106 (August 4, 1965); P.L. 88-74 (July 22,

1963); P.L. 87-788 (Oct. 10, 1962); P.L. 85-934 (Sept. 6, 1958);
P.L. 352, chapter 790 (Aug. 11, 1955).
10.

Every state spent more than the required matching share on

extension according to our estimates.

For research, a few small

states did not exceed their matching share each year.
11.
ture.

See Gramlich (1977, pp. 231-234) for a review of the litera-
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12.

The basic model was developed simultaneously by Courant,

Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979).
13.

With a 50% matching rate, a one dollar increase in federal

grants means that one dollar of state money must be used to
satisfy the matching requirements.

Thus if b

1

is the coef-

ficient on FEDRS/SB when STRS/SB is the dependent variable, then
in the XSTRS/SB equation the coefficient on FEDRS/SB must be b
=

b

14.

1

- 1.

2

A similar condition holds for extension.
In the most recent data sets farm population is a signifi-

. cant determinant of excess research spending (Table 2).

This

result is consistent with the predicted effect of reapportionment
discussed in the text.
15.

A shift from the minimum residual (RESFMRS = -.12) to the

maximum residual (RESFMRS

= .20) shifts the predicted research

2
share (times 10 ) by about .32.

This is a large shift since

the standard deviation of STRS/SB in this data set is .15 and of
XSTRS/SB, .11.
16.

This result does not carry over into recent years when we

have a measure of RESFMRS.
17.

The difference between research and extension may reflect

the lower fungibility of extension spending.

If federal funding

is tied to particular programs at the margin it may effectively
require some marginal matching by states.
18.

See also Table 2 where the impact of federal grants is seen

to be stronger for both research and extension for the years
1969, 1974, 1978.

In fact, for extension, total appropriations

increase by the entire one dollar required for matching.

Since
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the restriction, b

2

=

b

1

- 1, must hold in every year (see note

13), the coefficients on the interaction terms APP* FEDRS/SB had to
be equal to each other in both the STRS/SB and the XSTRS/SB equations.
Thus if b

1

and b

2

are the grant coefficients in the early years,

then the coefficients in the later year must have the form b
b

2

+ k, where k is a constant.

Then h

2

+ k

= b1

1

+ k,

+ k - 1 holds.

The same restriction, of course, must be imposed for extension.

Some

of our results are sensitive to the functional form used in the regre
ssions.

Appendix 2 reports results for a log-linear specification and

compares them to the results reported here.

By and large the main

conclusions are not altered, however.
19.

Cooperative State Research Service U.S. Department of

Agriculture, Inventory of Agricultural Research.
20.

The returns may be somewhat lower in the 1970s than in the

1950s but they continue to be relatively high.
Peterson (1976).

See Bredahl and

